Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2012

Integrating Humanities into Family Law and the Problem with
Truths Universally Acknowledged
Carol Sanger
Columbia Law School, csanger@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Carol Sanger, Integrating Humanities into Family Law and the Problem with Truths Universally
Acknowledged, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 34 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3037

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

California Law Review Circuit
Vol. 3

January 2012
Copyright © 2012 by California Law Review, Inc.

AALS Section on Law and Humanities
“Excavating and Integrating Law and Humanities in the Core Curriculum”
2012 AALS Annual Meeting - January 4–8, 2012 - Washington, D.C.

Integrating Humanities into Family Law
and the Problem with Truths Universally
Acknowledged
Carol Sanger*
INTRODUCTION
Family Law differs from the other subjects under discussion today in at
least two respects. As a matter of curricular location, it is not always considered
a core course. I am therefore grateful for Melissa Murray’s public recognition
of the “coreness” of Family Law within a legal education. Second, if one
purpose of integrating humanities into the core curriculum is to humanize the
law, it is probably safe to say that Family Law is already humanized enough.
The subject comes fully loaded with all too human conflict and suffering:
cruelty, anger, sex, disappointed expectations, and all of these play out along
one or another gender matrix. Indeed, it’s hard to think of any subject in Family
Law—maybe jurisdiction?—that doesn’t have at least a flash of pain below the
surface. Students don’t need to watch Kramer vs. Kramer,1 to use an ancient
example, in order to understand the aftermath of divorce. A fair few of them
will have experienced both the run-up and the aftermath themselves. The

Copyright © 2012 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
* Barbara Aronstein Black Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
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problem in Family Law is more often tamping down classroom emotions than
expanding them.
And yet, I regularly supplement my Family Law courses with materials
from the humanities, and this panel has provided the occasion for me to think
more reflectively about why I do this and what I want students to get out of it. 2
I will put three reasons on the table, and take two off pretty fast. The first
reason is that showing and telling is fun. Most of us have used props in one or
another course, whether a stuffed fox, a firecracker, or a photo of Shirley
MacLaine.3 A second reason is that drawing from sources outside of law makes
us look cool. Put another way, outside sources humanize not only the materials
but they humanize us too. But alas, fun and cool may not fully justify the move
toward humanities, in part because I suspect we might get this part wrong. Our
coolness frames of reference are in most cases not the same as our students’.
Monty Python is no longer the lingua franca of cleverness, and I can’t reliably
tell you what is. And as for props, I’m not sure that any law student today cares
what Shirley MacLaine looks like. Moreover, to the extent that either fun or
cool is a matter of finding props to accompany the cases, students are far better
at uncovering items and images than we are.4
A sounder basis for integrating humanities into our classes is, of course,
that it enhances how we teach in substantively significant ways. I have spent
some time thinking about what these ways are, and I want to try out my ideas
this morning using aspects of marriage as my testing ground.
I spend a full month on marriage in Family Law, and I use a fair range of
what I’ll call “extrinsic evidence” from the humanities. Because there is so
much one could use, I am fairly strict with myself about what I do use. It seems
2. I am putting aside the question of what we mean by “humanities.” I will simply use the
definition supplied by the federal government in the National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities
Act of 1965: humanities includes but is not limited to
the study of the following: language, both modern and classical; linguistics; literature;
history; jurisprudence; philosophy; archaeology; comparative religion; ethics; the history,
criticism and theory of the arts; those aspects of social sciences which have humanistic
content and employ humanistic methods; and the study and application of the humanities to
the human environment with particular attention to reflecting our diverse heritage,
traditions, and history and to the relevance of the humanities to the current conditions of
national life.
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C § 951 (1965). The
definition seems to omit economics, engineering, and the hard sciences but is otherwise quite
capacious.
3. Several contract casebooks include pictures of Shirley MacLaine to accompany Parker v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176 (1970), a popular mitigation of damages case, to
liven things up. Indeed, there was a feminist critique some thirty years ago about whether the inclusion
of a can-can kicking Shirley MacLaine was the best approach to thinking more deeply about the ways
in which the teaching of contracts might be problematically gendered. See Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading
Contracts A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1984–1985).
4. Of course, props are fun. What contracts professor wouldn’t want to introduce a new
generation to The Ronettes singing Be My Baby (see Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E. 166
(2d Cir. 2002) (contract’s silence on synchronization and domestic licensing does not create an
ambiguity opening door to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties)), and actually show
them the adorable Ronettes. See THE RONETTES, BE MY BABY (Philles Records 1963).
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important that when we take the time to introduce new materials, it should not
be just a matter of word association football (“this novel reminds me of this
case”), but rather that the materials connect to larger themes around which the
doctrinal topics are wrapped or from which legal rules emerge. In Family Law
these themes include the relation between family and market structures; Family
Law as a reflection of contemporary social values on race, gender, and
everything else; constitutional limitations on the regulation of intimate
relationships; and the politics of Family Law and law reform. Connection to
these larger themes provides one way of sorting and sifting the wealth of
material from which one might choose.
However, I want to suggest a different reason why I am willing to take
time away from doctrine and case law to spend it in the humanities. My
suggestion is this: The humanities expand the imagination so that students can
understand lives that are not like their own. The lives presented in novels or
recounted in interviews may not be like the lives of our students because of
when (or sometimes where) the two sets of lives are lived. They may not be
like their own because of cultural differences, or because of the sometimes
inexplicable nature of preferences and the choices that people make with regard
to intimate relationships. This imaginative reach toward understanding different
lives, times, or preferences is important in a number of ways.
The first has to do with classroom exchange. A work of fiction—and I
draw many of my examples today from literary sources—provides a common
text that enables students to simultaneously focus upon and distance themselves
from the subject at hand. Precisely because it is invented, focusing on a
fictional character avoids putting any one person or group in the class on the
spot to have to “own” a particular subject: polygamy, say, or same-sex
marriage. I am not saying that student experience is not valuable. I am saying
that a fact-rich, emotionally intricate common text offers the opportunity to
discuss hard topics without the silent expectation or nod that any particular
black, gay, Latino, poor, or Mormon member of the class will have to defend or
explicate the issue for the rest of us.
The ability to understand other lives different from one’s own also matters
with regard to interactions outside the academy. Some of our students will
represent clients; others will sit in judgment on them. Still others will be
involved in drafting, enacting, and even vetoing legislation. All of these
activities are, I suggest, better carried out when the judge, legislator, or
executive has developed imaginative capacities about how other lives are lived
and how law is experienced. This is not quite the same thing as empathy, a
practice that sadly has been downgraded from a virtue to a political liability in
recent times.5 It may be possible to appreciate or grasp a position or

5. See Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, NOMOS VII (forthcoming 2012). The “turn”
became explicitly political during Justice Kagan’s confirmation hearings when Senators Grassley and
Sessions objected to the exercise of empathy by judges. See Dahlia Lithwick, Supreme Court
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sentiment—to see or recognize something from the perspective of the subject—
without necessarily identifying emotionally with the subject’s sentiment,
circumstances, or plight. That is, as Susan Bandes has explained, to grasp
another’s position may at one level be simply the cognitive capacity to
understand what others are thinking or feeling.6 But it can go deeper: moral
imagination or empathy is also “the ability to stand in the shoes of another, to
understand that others have concerns and feelings and values different from our
own. It is a tool, a capacity, and one that does not necessarily come easily.”7
And as Bandes insists, either form is “essential for living in the social world,”
the very place we mean for our students to hang out.8
So far I have been speaking rather generally about what work humanities
does for teaching law and why the method, perhaps uniquely, sharpens, often
subtly, students’ sense of what law encompasses beyond black letters. I want now
to turn to a few concrete examples from three subtopics of marriage—incest,
adultery, and race—to show how the humanities contribute to richer, more complicated understandings of topics that on first glance might look less complicated.
I.
INCEST
I begin with incest. Most Family Law casebooks have a case or two on
incest, usually as an example of statutory prohibitions on marriage. Students
learn about degrees of affinity and whether relations of the whole blood and the
half should be treated the same. They may learn that in other cultures incest is
more narrowly defined than in the United States so that marriages between
cousins, for example, or uncles and nieces do not traditionally fall within the
prohibited range in the country of origin. Yet, as reported in a 2003 New York
Times article, cousin marriage in the United States—and not between immigrant
couples but among the home-grown marrying kind—is practiced here as well.9 In
my experience, the subject of cousin marriage tends to make students nervous,
and that nervousness can be put to good use. Again, what I want students to think
about, although I don’t spell it out this way, is that practices that may look
peculiar to us (the big Us who stands for everyone else) are not always peculiar
to others and that there may be a logic, and even a necessity, to those practices.

Breakfast Table Empathy Has No Party, SLATE (June 29, 2010, 4:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/life/the_breakfast_table/features/2010/supreme_court_breakfast_table/empathy_has_no_party.
html.
6. Susan Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 101, 109 (2012).
7. Id. at 112.
8. Id. at 109.
9. Sarah Kershaw, Shaking Off the Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/garden/26cousins.html?pagewanted=all. The practice is also
reflected in a more recent Times piece on incest as a topic in television programming. See Dave
Itzkoff, A Family Affair as Old as Oedipus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.11, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/arts/television/incest-as-plot-point-on-3-hbo-series-just-bychance.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=incest&st=cse.

38

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW CIRCUIT

[Vol. 3:34

One can get at this, in the case of incest, with a most interesting socioeconomic history of nineteenth-century incest written by British anthropologist
Adam Kuper. In Incest and Influence: The Private Life of Bourgeois England
Kuper argues that in nineteenth-century England cousin marriage was crucial
for the consolidation of family capital so that family commercial enterprises
could thrive.10 He focuses on two kinds of enterprise: the banking business and
the development of British potteries. Kuper charts out the regime of cousin
marriage among the Rothschilds in the first case and the Wedgewoods in the
second. He also has a wonderful opening section that discusses the near endless
and ever-so-normal marriages between cousins (and functional siblings) in the
nineteenth-century British novel. I don’t assign that part but I do put the book
on reserve. That is not because I think novels are not central to the project at
hand but because one can’t do everything. There is also a more recent novel,
the extraordinary Middlesex by Jeffrey Eugenides, which considers, among
other transformative depictions, consensual incest within the context of a
family immigration story.11 Finally, if one is into film festivals—spoiler
alert!—John Sayles’s movie Lone Star offers an intriguing presentation of
incest that again pushes viewers off the comfortable incest perch where you
think you know what you think about it, and makes you reconsider.12 One
comes to understand that people may marry cousins or even siblings for reasons
that are not inexplicable, however we in the end decide to regulate the practice.
II.
ADULTERY
My second topic for a humanities intervention is adultery. As a few here
may remember, adultery was once a common ground for divorce back in the
day when you had to have a ground. In New York it was the only ground until
1966. But our students don’t know about “back in the day.” The idea that you
could not simply divorce a person to whom you no longer wanted to be
married, for just that reason alone, comes as a shock. Like, what’s law’s
problem, anyhow? I think, as well, that most of our students don’t know much
about being married—either its joys and satisfactions or its exasperations and
discontents. They have also not thought much about the relation between the
content or quality of a marriage and the how and the rules of exit.
To get at that intriguing topic, I often use two sources. The first is the
Prologue to Phyllis Rose’s group biography Parallel Lives: Five Victorian
10. ADAM KUPER, INCEST AND INFLUENCE: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF BOURGEOIS ENGLAND
(2009).
11. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX (2002). I also recommend the short and powerful The
All of It by Irish novelist Jeanette Haien and Susan Frelich Appelton’s review essay of Middlesex.
JEANETTE HAIEN, THE ALL OF IT (1988); Susan Frelich Appelton, Transgender Tales Jeffrey
Eugenides’s Middlesex and Other Stories of Popular Culture, Sex, and Law (Wash. U., School of
Law, Working Paper No. 04-01-03), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=491223.
12. LONE STAR (Columbia Pictures 1996).
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Marriages.13 The Prologue is a general contemplation of married life, at a time
when at least within a particular class, divorce was not only hard to get but also
stigmatizing. But Rose observes that modern divorce law also burdens
marriage, and in an interesting way: it is “[b]ad enough to choose once in a lifetime whom to live with; to go on choosing, to reaffirm one’s choice day after
day, as one must when it is culturally possible to divorce, is really asking a lot
of people.”14 Marriage, even amiable marriage, does ask a lot of people. The
second source is the chapter “Vulnerability by Marriage” from political theorist
Susan Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family.15 Here Okin applies sociological
exit theory—those who have less power about leaving an institution have less
power while in the institution—to the situation of wives in marriage. Students
may dispute whether twenty-first-century marriages fit this late twentiethcentury model, but the chapter gives them new vocabulary and perhaps new
insights into why marriages sometimes work as they sometimes do.
And this leads us back to adultery. Adultery comes in at least two legal
formats: real adultery and fabricated adultery, and I begin with the fabricated. I
like teaching fault-based divorce, and not only because fault is always
attempting a come-back in one form or another, but also because it helps
students understand what is going on in all those movies from the 1930s, 40s,
and 50s.16 I like teaching fault because it shows what the incorporation of moral
judgments into Family Law looks like, not in theory but when it is
operationalized. Chapter 4 of Evelyn Waugh’s 1934 novel A Handful of Dust
offers a grand account of how the evidence necessary to prove adultery is
negotiated, assembled, and rehearsed, and how many things can go wrong in
the process.17 I’ve almost never had an uninteresting class discussion about our
hero Tony, whose wife Lady Brenda has informed him that she simply must
have a divorce in order to marry her lover. The dutiful Tony must then go about
finding a suitable co-respondent for himself in order to stage an assignation by
the sea that is suitably sordid and suitably documented.18

13. PHYLLIS ROSE, PARALLEL LIVES: FIVE VICTORIAN MARRIAGES 18 (1983).
14. Id. at 18.
15. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1988).
16. Take the following exchange from Alfred Hitchcock’s 1938 film, The Lady Vanishes in
which “Mrs.” Todhunter tries to force her married lover’s hand by making their relationship public:
“Mrs.” Todhunter:
If there is a scandal, there'll be a divorce. You couldn’t let me down. You’d have to do
the decent thing as only you know how.
Mr. Todhunter:
You forgot one very important thing, Margaret . . . your husband would divorce you,
no doubt. But my wife will never divorce me.
THE LADY VANISHES (Gainsborough Pictures 1938). The script is available at The Lady Vanishes
Script-Dialogue Script, SCRIPT-O-RAMA.COM, http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/l/thelady-vanishes-script-transcript.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
17. EVELYN WAUGH, A HANDFUL OF DUST (1934). See generally Walter Wadlington, Divorce
Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966).
18. To keep things neat, in early nineteenth-century Scotland, after an adultery-based divorce,
the offending partner was prohibited from marrying the co-respondent.
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Despite what I said before about no time for fun, this is fun. It clarifies
how to hire a baby sitter if your co-respondent should turn up with her own
child in tow, or how much to take off for the mandatory photographic of posed
in flagrante relations.19 It also helps clarify how mid-century gender roles
structured the procedural aspects of divorce. As one of my students this year
asked in genuine confusion, why would a man who was really having an affair
insist that she be the plaintiff in the divorce action thereby requiring him to
fabricate his own affair? I explained that this was the gentlemanly thing to do,
and that Tony was a gentleman. This was regarded with some incomprehension
by my student. Didn’t I understand that this made things worse for Tony? Yes!,
I replied back, but there were social costs to him of doing otherwise.
And the point of this back and forth? It is not to educate a class in 2012
about the mores of the upper class in 1934 England. Rather, it is to provide
something of a case study to show a situation where people take positions in law
that may be contrary to their own apparent interests, and to use an example that
is largely unfamiliar to students so that when an example comes that is factually
more familiar—a mother taking less in child support in order to secure custody,
for example—the outline of the phenomenon will already have been established.
Earlier I mentioned real adultery, and here I want to introduce a short
story by Alice Munro called The Bear Came over the Mountain.20 (The story
was made into a movie called Away from Her, with Julie Christie.21) The story
concerns a married woman in her sixties who decides that her Alzheimer’s
disease has become sufficiently disabling that it is time to go into sheltered
living. Her husband reluctantly agrees, visiting her faithfully. He slowly comes
to understand that she has fallen in love with another patient. This is a strange
sort of adultery, and one that the husband comes not only to accept but to make
possible by securing the funds so that the man can stay in the facility. I like the
story because it captures the complexity of long-term marriage in an interesting
way: the husband’s tactics in supporting his wife’s unfaithfulness are endearing
and involve his own unfaithfulness. The idea of adultery within a happy
marriage and not for purposes of thrills but devotion is something new, though
something similar seems to have played out quietly with regard to Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s husband before his death in 2009.22

19. Lawrence Friedman reports a 1932 study of itemized states of undress—kimonos, BVDs,
and dressing gowns—in divorce actions in New York City. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead
Language Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1513 (2000).
20. Alice Munro, The Bear Came over the Mountain, in HATESHIP, FRIENDSHIP, COURTSHIP,
LOVESHIP, MARRIAGE: STORIES (2002). Short stories are an economical way to introduce the
humanties. Each story in the Munro volume hits the mark. Two older sources worth rummaging are
AMERICAN FAMILIES: 28 SHORT STORIES (Barbara Solomon ed., 1989) and THE NEW FAMILY (Scott
Walker ed., 1991). An excellent collection of short stories about adoption is ELYSE GASCO, CAN YOU
WAVE BYE BYE, BABY?: STORIES (1999).
21. AWAY FROM HER (The Film Farm 2006).
22. Joan Biskupic, A New Page in O’Connors’ Love Story, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-11-12-court_N.htm.
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III.
RACE
Finally, in considering integrating the humanities into our teaching, it is
worth remembering that law itself is located within the humanities. I therefore
draw my last example from case law to suggest that there are excavating
possibilities in our own backyard. The case I have in mind is Sargent v.
Sargent, a 1920 case from New Jersey that is included in the current Areen and
Regan Family Law casebook as an example of the old-fashioned doctrine of
collusion.23 The facts are sort of cute: A wife has an affair with the family
chauffeur, and because the husband may have known about but did nothing to
stop it, his request for a divorce is denied. So far so good; a bit of doctrine with
room for reflection on changing notions of spousal obligation as mediated
through gender.
But if one digs deeper, the excerpt in the casebook is revealed to be
dangerously misleading and inadequate, for it turns out that Sargent v. Sargent
is riddled with race.24 The husband and wife were an upper-class white couple
and the chauffeur, according to the court, “a coffee colored negro, showing the
characteristics of his race, save that his hair is straight . . . [,] intelligent, but
speaking ungrammatically, and I would say of not a prepossessing
appearance.”25 In contrast, Mrs. Sargent appeared to be “a woman of modest
demeanor and of refinement and education, . . . [possessing] beauty of face and
form.”26 While the court announces a general rule about a husband’s duty to
protect his wife from misadventure when he suspects her of it, the key in this
case is race. Despite a wagon load of witnesses, early wire-tapping, and much
other evidence, the court finds the underlying premise unthinkable:
The thought of this cultured, refined, and modest appearing white
woman in sexual relation with any negro is revolting to the senses. . . .
To convince me that defendant has departed from the traditions of her
race and has fallen so low in the human scale and has been so grossly
immoral as to place herself among the most debased of womankind the
evidence must be so convincing and compelling as to leave no doubt
whatever existing in my mind as to her guilt.27
Arguing in the alternative, the court further concludes that if Mrs. Sargent
did have an affair, it was all Mr. Sargent’s doing: “Would an outraged husband,
who had learned that a negro was his wife’s lover, want to be in the presence of
a wife who had so dishonored him, without an ulterior motive on his part? . . .

23. JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (5th ed.,
2006).
24. Sargent v. Sargent, 114 A. 428 (N.J. Ch. 1920). I am grateful to Prof. Bela Walker for
introducing me to this aspect of the case, while she was a student at Columbia Law School.
25. Id. at 429.
26. Id. She was also “a member of various women’s organizations, of a Browning society, of
musical clubs, and she was a church attendant.” Id.
27. Id. at 430.
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It is also difficult to resist the conclusion that he wanted her to commit
adultery. Certainly his conduct does not indicate that he did not want her to.”28
Thus the case is not so much about old-fashioned gender roles as old-fashioned
racism, embedded in paragraph after paragraph of the long decision.
Sargent is not an easy case to discuss in class, but I think it is worth the
discomfort (recognizing that the discomfort might not be shared evenly
throughout the class). Race permeates Family Law; we are all familiar with
Loving, with Palmore, with Moore v. East Cleveland.29 Sargent, in contrast,
involves no constitutional challenges. It is just the courts of New Jersey making
sure that the social order remains orderly as they apply the regular rules of
Family Law to a divorce request. In this way, the full case, like a short story,
gives students a more complete story about how race and intimacy operated in
the 1920s in a northern state. The case helps get us ready for Loving by laying
out the utter unthinkability of interracial sex as an aspect of marriage law.30 It
also foreshadows the tremendous bravery of Richard and Mildred Loving.
Here I quickly mention Robert Pratt’s autobiographical insights into that
latter case, as Pratt, when a boy, sat on his grandmother’s porch and watched
Richard Loving pull into his garage each night and pull the door down.31
Pratt’s essay also brings Griswold into new light. He describes how five years
after the Lovings married, in the early hours of the morning Sherriff R.
Garnett Brooks and two other law enforcement officers “opened the unlocked
door of their home, walked into their bedroom, and shined a flashlight in their
faces.”32 When the Supreme Court in Griswold describes the imagined horror
of “the police . . . search[ing] the sacred precincts of marital bedroom for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives,” it is Mildred and Richard who
come easily to mind.33
CONCLUSION
Are there reasons to pause before turning to the humanities? Certainly. The
diversion takes time and no one ever thinks they have time enough to cover all
the important stuff as it is. This can be overcome, however, in part by losing the
term “diversion”—that is by integrating rather than tacking on—and by recon-

28. Id. at 438–39.
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
30. See RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE (2003); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION (2002).
31. Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative
of Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOW. L. J. 229 (1997–1998).
32. Id. at 236.
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). See also Mark Strasser, Sex, Law, and the
Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bedroom On State and Federal Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 753-89 (2000).
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sidering just what the important stuff is. I am not willing to let certain topics go
without the slightest worry that I am putting a dent in anyone’s legal education.
But a second and more humbling hesitation is this: we are not all trained in the
humanities and in reaching for what is unquestionably good material, I think we
have to have some humility about our ability to teach it. Integrating humanities
has to mean something more than “I read a good book that has something to do
with X and it would be really fun to teach it.” As bestowed with natural talent as
my mother thinks I am, I really don’t know how to teach literature or history.34
That is not to say any of us shouldn’t sometimes stretch ourselves to study up
(or pair up) and try something new; it is only to say that integrating the
humanities is not only a matter of their relevance, but our abilities.35
There is, of course, much more. I adore Philip Larkin’s This Be the Verse,
which is really good when teaching either custody or contraception, and you
get to say a bad word.36 But I will leave it with race, incest, and adultery, and
urge you all to give them a try.

34. In this regard, I have been lucky to pair up with someone who does know how to teach at
least one of them. I regularly co-teach a seminar, “Meanings of Motherhood: Legal and Historical
Perspectives,” with history professor Alice Kessler-Harris. But we know our limits. Much as we are
tempted each time we revise our syllabus to include Toni Morrison’s Beloved, we do not. See TONI
MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
35. As an example, I quite like an essay by Jeremy Waldron called When Justice Replaces
Affection The Need for Rights. Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection The Need for
Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625 (1988). The piece uses Romeo and Juliet to explore how law
stands at the ready when communal norms fail. Because I am not philosophically trained, I leave out
the part on Immanuel Kant. But I like what Waldron drew from Germaine Greer’s characterization of
the play: the tragedy of Romeo and Juliet not as wretched bad luck for star-crossed lovers, but rather as
the inevitable isolation and misunderstandings that result when people are deprived of the framework
of civil marriage in circumstances where clan hostilities deprive them of a solution within the more
intimate community of family.
36. They fuck you up, your mum and dad.
They may not mean to, but they do.
They fill you with the faults they had
And add some extra, just for you.
But they were fucked up in their turn
By fools in old-style hats and coats,
Who half the time were soppy-stern
And half at one another’s throats.
Man hands on misery to man.
It deepens like a coastal shelf.
Get out as early as you can,
And don’t have any kids yourself.
Philip Larkin, This Be the Verse, in COLLECTED POEMS (2001), available at
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/178055 (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). A recording of Larkin
reading it himself is also available. This Be the Verse, YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qahT62n8tcA (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).

